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The Trinity: A Philosophical Investigation, by H.E. Baber. SCM Press, 2019. 
Pp. v + 204. $92.00 (hardcover).
ALAN J. PIHRINGER, Harvest Baptist
H.E. Baber engages in the field of philosophical theology, which she 
describes as the study of the “machinery of religious doctrines and the 
logical problems they involve” (1). While the Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity is not illogical (in the purest sense of the term), it has nonetheless 
caused many a theologian and philosopher problems over the centuries—
problems in articulation and problems in explanation. Yet, it is not a doc-
trine that comes only by blind religious faith without the possibility of 
philosophical inquiry and understanding. While some in scholarship may 
see the philosophical inquiry into theology or doctrine as an inefficient 
use of time and resources (especially if said inquiry does not answer major 
human problems or support the formation of a particular philosophical 
system), others, like Baber, deem the implications of such doctrine both 
important and interesting. She leads the reader on a philosophical analytic 
journey of the greatest doctrinal puzzle in history: How can the claim that 
the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God be consistent 
with the claim that they are also distinct? Or, to state the problem dif-
ferently, how does one reconcile a monotheistic religious claim with the 
doctrine of Christ’s divinity?
Baber begins with what I would consider an apologetic to her approach 
in this work. The early articulations of the Trinitarian doctrine used the 
philosophical terminology of the day regarding the “substance” of the 
personages’s identity within the Trinity. Yet, there were disagreements as 
to what the term referred, making it difficult to buttress one’s inquiry into 
the matter. Baber, rather, finds that “the substantive question of Trinitarian 
theology should be approached as a problem of characterizing the rela-
tions between Trinitarian Persons that make them count as one God 
and distinguish them one from another” (16). The Hebrew conviction of 
monotheism gives a background for inquiry, but even so, one must con-
sider what they meant by the term. Often taken to engender identity and 
counting, the concept may arguably be better understood to inquire as 
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to who or what is a worship-worthy divine being. For the Hebrews, only 
Jehovah met the criteria. This then raises the question, what are the crite-
ria and how does Christianity avoid polytheism when claiming Christ is 
divine? It was not enough that he be a supernatural being, for many reli-
gions have a plethora of such beings. Rather, the bar was set for one who 
was the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator. That being the 
case, identity per se is not as important as meeting the criteria for divin-
ity. Much of the Trinitarian doctrine would then hinge on the Persons 
satisfying such criteria. But then this creates other problems, as per the 
Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII): if the persons who meet the 
criteria are then indistinguishable in all intrinsic and extrinsic relational 
properties they are identical. If one were to relax the criteria to distinguish 
the Persons, then the Persons may no longer count as God. “There are no 
philosophically respectable arguments for the existence of lesser super-
natural beings [that are] anything like the gods of the Greeks” (37). Thus, 
it is more fruitful to begin the inquiry with the relations of the Persons (the 
processions or relations of origin) and address the identity question in a 
further study.
Baber deconstructs the normal distinctions historically given to the 
Trinitarian problem—designated as the De Régnon Paradigm (as implied 
in the works of Catholic historian Theodore de Régnon) between the 
Latin Trinitarianism of Augustine and Aquinas against the Greek/Social 
Trinitarianism of the Cappadocian Fathers. The Latin school began with 
unity, trying to make sense of the distinctions, while the Greek school did 
the opposite. Scholars who have attempted to discuss such a distinction 
have found that the differences do not line up as neatly as first thought. 
Social Trinitarianism focuses on the distinctiveness of the Persons—each 
being a distinct center of consciousness with their own knowledge, will, 
and action, yet so tightly woven together that they form one particular 
social unit or society. Some concerns arise in that the Social view is una-
ble to answer concerns about how each distinct Person of divinity would 
avoid disagreeing over agendas and actions. It could be argued that the 
Father is authoritative and the other Persons merely defer to him, but 
this does not explain how or why this deference takes place. Baber sees 
the De Régnon distinction as one of a difference in the questions asked 
of Trinitarian theology; thus one must answer both the Latin and Greek 
questions accounting for “both the unity and distinctions of the persons” 
(52). She contends that philosophers ought not seek to defend or define a 
particular orthodoxy, but rather develop a logically coherent theology that 
has the capability of affirming monotheism and Christ’s divinity. Baber 
will then argue that the Son and Holy Spirit are divine in virtue of their 
relation to the Father, the one of whom no greater can be conceived, the 
unique worship-worthy God. This understanding is of great importance 
since it seemingly turns PII (as normally understood) on its head. The 
Persons within the Godhead are indiscernible regarding both intrinsic 
and extrinsic properties, but are instead discernible only with regard to 
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their relation with one another. Another consideration is the Council of 
Nicaea’s handling of the subject with its emphasis on the Son being of one 
“substance” with the Father. Baber argues that this was not so much to 
define the doctrine as to exclude the Arian heresy. Thus, the work of the 
philosophic inquiry is to “make sense of the claim that Christ, identified 
as the Son and distinct from the Father, is fully divine,” so the path to 
consider is that of “the relations between Trinitarian Persons in virtue of 
which they are distinct but equal to the Father and so fully divine” (60).
Baber specifically tackles and dismantles the normal analytic approach to 
trinitarian doctrine of Social Trinitarianism (in the form of Three-Self trini-
tarian theology). Social trinitarians make more of the claim than they are able 
to prove or deliver and have often used the approach to further their own 
social or political agendas. This is misplaced as the philosophical inquiry 
into the Trinity does not have an immediate practical import, but rather 
addresses the logical difficulties that the doctrine poses. Social Trinitarianism 
views the Trinity as a divine society where the Persons interact with one 
another in a manner akin to humans and are therefore a model for human 
relationships—a veritable gold mine for social scientists to try to advocate 
for their particular social constructs using the Trinity as their validation. 
However, the Social Trinitarian view comes at a cost. For example, Baber 
indicates a central feature of interpersonal relations is epistemic asymmetry, 
where the individual is privileged to their own epistemic state. Yet, each of 
the Persons of the Trinity, being omniscient, would know everything about 
everything including the psychological state of the other. Social Trinitarians 
will offer proof texts from Scripture and from the church fathers, but their 
interpretations were not embraced by much of Christianity throughout its 
history, reconstruction and misinterpretations notwithstanding. For exam-
ple, Gregory of Nyssa’s analogy of the Trinitarian persons sharing a nature 
to three men sharing a nature has been accepted as demonstrating “three 
distinct centers of consciousness [that] interact interpersonally with one 
another in community” (83), yet this results from taking the analogy way 
beyond its original intention. Social Trinitarians also argue for viewing the 
Trinity as a community of mutual holy love based on God being perfect 
in love—a love understood as the desire for the good of the object loved. 
Since some theologians would argue that self-love is not a virtuous love, 
and since the creation is not necessary, the argument goes that God must 
have a love for a distinct divine other. Baber believes that a weakness of the 
love argument is that it does not explain why there are three (no more, no 
less) divine subjects, nor does it preclude two or more distinct gods with a 
mutual love, rather than a monotheistic view of one God with three distinct 
divine persons. In what she sees as another overreach, Social Trinitarians 
look to the community of the Godhead “to articulate an understanding of 
human nature, to provide an account of the good life and the good society, 
and to support their preferred moral views and political agendas” (96). This 
venture is problematic in that no two Social Trinitarians agree about the 
details of human community that the Trinity doctrine supposedly prompts, 
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they give no impetus as to why their views are different from their secular 
counterparts, and they do not take serious consideration of the human con-
dition in its fallen state. The danger is using one’s Trinitarian theology as 
a weapon in pushing one’s own political agenda. Baber rightly notes that 
there is “a difficulty in extracting any insights about human nature, moral 
agendas, or recommendations for social organization from any theological 
account of the Trinity, including the Social Trinitarians’ preferred account” 
(102). There just is no leverage to the idea that the Trinitarian Persons relate 
in the same sense as humans; therefore, Social Trinitarian Three-Self doc-
trine is left wanting.
Baber continues by addressing the answers given by the Latin and 
Greek questions per her relational take. With the Latin question, since 
each Person shares the same intrinsic generically divine properties, their 
distinction must be found in some other difference between them. As 
mentioned earlier, per the PII, if the Persons share the same relevant prop-
erties, they would be identical. Yet the Persons are distinct, so there must 
be one differentiating property that they do not share. Of course, the PII 
itself is controversial in that not all agree what qualities count for the pur-
poses of the principle, and if it includes both intrinsic and extrinsic qual-
ities or solely intrinsic. In addition, counterexamples appear to weaken 
the PII argument (for example Max Black’s illustration of two identical 
spheres in a symmetrical universe). Baber considers other possibilities 
for making the distinction (what one might consider weaker versions of 
the PII). One view is that the objects have haecceities which are “impure 
properties that make them the particular individuals they are and distin-
guish them from other individuals, including their qualitative duplicates” 
(115). These would allow non-qualitative differences in properties without 
implying inequality between objects. There are also ways of differentiat-
ing Persons through the asymmetric relation of objects to one another or 
their irreflexive relation (as, for example, two identical spheres that are 
one mile from each other but are obviously not one mile from themselves). 
In addition, some Social Trinitarians argue that each of the Persons within 
the Trinity might have some hypostatic properties intrinsic and essential 
to them that are indiscernible to mere mortals. However, if the persons 
are not intrinsically differentiated as in such models, it is possible they 
are extrinsically differentiated. Sabellianism (modalism) attempted to dif-
ferentiate the Persons through their communication with the world—the 
same being interacting with the world in three distinct ways. This hereti-
cal view, while not necessarily logically problematic from an economic 
Trinitarian perspective, fails to distinguish divine Persons and violates the 
Necessity of Identity, since it allows that God is not necessarily Trinitarian. 
One final possibility is Structuralism, investigating the structural features 
of the subject. Most often used in mathematics, a structure is “the abstract 
form of a system, which ignores or abstracts away from any features of 
the objects that do not bear on their relations.  .  .  . The objects of a sys-
tem occupy places within the structure and, since different systems may 
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exemplify the same structure, different objects may occupy the same place 
within a structure” (141). The Trinitarian Persons can be understood as 
places within a structure differentiated by their asymmetrical relations. 
Since each part in the system is an individual substance with a rational 
nature, the Persons are objectively distinct, and the differentiating rela-
tions are real relations all of which are essential to the system. Therefore, 
we may “understand the Trinitarian Persons as objects differentiated by 
the places they occupy within the Trinitarian structure” (144). Although 
not a perfect explanation, it does offer a way to differentiate the Persons 
by the places they occupy within the structure.
The Greek question assumes there are three divine Persons and inquires 
about what it is that makes them one God. Since the divinity of the Father 
is not in dispute, the larger question is what then makes the Son and Holy 
Spirit divine in a way that preserves the shared nature? Some claim that 
the Son and Spirit are dependent on the Father metaphysically, therefore 
an account of the relation is due—a relation that is atemporal, asymmetric, 
and necessary. The term “Father” was oft utilized to refer to the paradig-
matic divine being, but this in no way granted him some special meta-
physical status that made the Son and Spirit metaphysically dependent on 
him nor made them in any way subordinate. Instead, in response to the 
Greek question, “we develop a Trinitarian theology in which the Father 
is the source of unity, uniting the Trinitarian Persons by the relations of 
ontological dependence that the Son and Spirit bear to the Father” (162). 
Baber suggests that there is a dependence of Son on Father, where the Son 
is divine in virtue of the Father being divine, but it is not a causal depend-
ence. The existence and character of the Father explains the existence and 
character of Father and Son, but not the other way around. Grounding sets 
the direction of a satisfactory explanation and sets the stage for further 
discussion on the metaphysics of the Trinity. The Father is the ground and 
not the cause in the ontological relations of the Persons. Still, it is a struggle 
to make sense of the claim that one eternal, necessary being is dependent 
upon another eternal, necessary being. The grounding account views God 
the Father in some (seemingly undefined) sense the principle upon which 
the other Trinitarian Persons depend. “Grounds and the grounded are not 
‘separate existences.’ They are not temporally or modally distinct” (176). 
Being given this answer I could not help asking how exactly this ground-
ing relation works, but as Baber herself admits this cries out for further 
discussion which I believe ought to occur as others interact with this book.
While not intending to be exhaustive, Baber’s work brings to the fore 
several of the most important ideas regarding this subject. It is a perfect 
complement of her previous articles without rehashing the same infor-
mation. She fairly handles opposing views, giving strong reasons for her 
disagreements. This is a deft example of philosophical theology at work, 
fulfilling its calling of demonstrating the importance of the subject while 
also making it interesting. Philosophers and theologians would benefit 
from drinking deeply from this well.
